piektdiena, 2017. gada 20. oktobris

Extracting personalised information: legal methods and illegal opportunities


                
                            Extracting  personalised information:  
                           legal methods and illegal opportunities

     Living in a habitual environment and adhering to a conservative way of life, most of us have not yet perceived, have not yet realised that people in the emerging digital society make information of a private nature publicly available and increasingly share it. This happens by communicating in social networks, taking part in electronic commerce and accumulating information requested by government institutions and private companies in relevant databases.
     Such sensitive information is obtained both in a legal way and as a result of the activity of hackers. Having been processed with the help of different algorithms, this information is further used both for purposeful targeted advertising, various scoring and also for criminal purposes. But what should be emphasised particularly is its use for supervision and control over the actions of the individual, for determining the identity of each member of society.
     The information that has been collected this way in the circumstances of limited democracy and that has ended up in the hands of special services may become (to a large extent, has already become!) a powerful means of influence, supervision, control and manipulation of people. Without taking this into account, we all risk a general degradation of democratic institutions, the coming to power of authoritarianism and totalitarianism.

     
In not-too-distant future, brain hackers could steal your deepest secrets
Religious beliefs, political leanings, and medical conditions are up for grabs.
DAN GOODIN - 2/1/2017
OAKLAND, Calif.—In the beginning, people hacked phones. In the decades to follow, hackers turned to computers, smartphones, Internet-connected security cameras, and other so-called Internet of things devices. The next frontier may be your brain, which is a lot easier to hack than most people think.
At the Enigma security conference here on Tuesday, University of Washington researcher Tamara Bonaci described an experiment that demonstrated how a simple video game could be used to covertly harvest neural responses to periodically displayed subliminal images. While her game, dubbed Flappy Whale, measured subjects' reactions to relatively innocuous things, such as logos of fast food restaurants and cars, she said the same setup could be used to extract much more sensitive information, including a person's religious beliefs, political leanings, medical conditions, and prejudices.
"Electrical signals produced by our body might contain sensitive information about us that we might not be willing to share with the world," Bonaci told Ars immediately following her presentation. "On top of that, we may be giving that information away without even being aware of it."
Flappy Whale had what Bonaci calls a BCI, short for "brain-connected interface." It came in the form of seven electrodes that connected to the player's head and measured electroencephalography signals in real time. The logos were repeatedly displayed, but only for milliseconds at a time, a span so short that subjects weren't consciously aware of them. By measuring the brain signals at the precise time the images were displayed, Bonaci's team was able to glean clues about the player's thoughts and feelings about the things that were depicted.
There's no evidence that such brain hacking has ever been carried out in the real world. But the researcher said it wouldn't be hard for the makers of virtual reality headgear, body-connected fitness apps, or other types of software and hardware to covertly mine a host of physiological responses. By repeatedly displaying an emotionally charged image for several milliseconds at a time, the pilfered data could reveal all kinds of insights about a person's most intimate beliefs. Bonaci has also theorized that sensitive electric signals could be obtained by modifying legitimate BCI equipment, such as those used by doctors.
Bonaci said that electrical signals produced by the brain are so sensitive that they should be classified as personally identifiable information and subject to the same protections as names, addresses, ages, and other types of PII. She also suggested that researchers and game developers who want to measure the responses for legitimate reasons should develop measures to limit what's collected instead of harvesting raw data. She said researchers and developers should be aware of the potential for "spillage" of potentially sensitive data inside responses that might appear to contain only mundane or innocuous information.
"What else is hidden in an electrical signal that's being used for a specific purpose?" she asked the audience, which was largely made up of security engineers and technologists. "In most cases when we measure, we don't need the whole signal.": https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/01/in-not-too-distant-future-brain-hackers-could-steal-your-deepest-secrets/
How Hackers Could Get Inside Your Head With ‘Brain Malware’
Victoria Turk Aug 3 2016
Brain-computer interfaces offer new applications for our brain signals—and a new vector for security and privacy violations.
Hackers have spyware in your mind. You're minding your business, playing a game or scrolling through social media, and all the while they're gathering your most private information direct from your brain signals. Your likes and dislikes. Your political preferences. Your sexuality. Your PIN.
It's a futuristic scenario, but not that futuristic. The idea of securing our thoughts is a real concern with the introduction of brain-computer interfaces—devices that are controlled by brain signals such as EEG (electroencephalography), and which are already used in medical scenarios and, increasingly, in non-medical applications such as gaming.
Researchers at the University of Washington in Seattle say that we need to act fast to implement a privacy and security framework to prevent our brain signals from being used against us before the technology really takes off.
"There's actually very little time," said electrical engineer Howard Chizeck over Skype. "If we don't address this quickly, it'll be too late."
I first met Chizeck and fellow engineer Tamara Bonaci when I visited the University of Washington Biorobotics Lab to check out their work on hacking teleoperated surgical robots. While I was there, they showed me some other hacking research they were working on, including how they could use a brain-computer interface (BCI), coupled with subliminal messaging in a videogame, to extract private information about an individual.
Bonaci showed me how it would work. She placed a BCI on my head—which looked like a shower cap covered in electrodes—and sat me in front of a computer to play Flappy Whale, a simple platform game based on the addictive Flappy Bird. All I had to do was guide a flopping blue whale through the on-screen course using the keyboard arrow keys. But as I happily played, trying to increase my dismal top score, something unusual happened. The logos for American banks started appearing: Chase, Citibank, Wells Fargo—each flickering in the top-right of the screen for just milliseconds before disappearing again. Blink and you'd miss them.
The idea is simple: Hackers could insert images like these into a dodgy game or app and record your brain's unintentional response to them through the BCI, perhaps gaining insight into which brands you're familiar with—in this case, say, which bank you bank with—or which images you have a strong reaction to.
Bonaci's team have several different Flappy Whale demos, also using logos from local coffee houses and fast food chains, for instance. You might not care who knows your weak spot for Kentucky Fried Chicken, but you can see where it's going: Imagine if these "subliminal" images showed politicians, or religious icons, or sexual images of men and women. Personal information gleaned this way could potentially be used for embarrassment, coercion, or manipulation.
"Broadly speaking, the problem with brain-computer interfaces is that, with most of the devices these days, when you're picking up electric signals to control an application… the application is not only getting access to the useful piece of EEG needed to control that app; it's also getting access to the whole EEG," explained Bonaci. "And that whole EEG signal contains rich information about us as persons."
And it's not just stereotypical black hat hackers who could take advantage. "You could see police misusing it, or governments—if you show clear evidence of supporting the opposition or being involved in something deemed illegal," suggested Chizeck. "This is kind of like a remote lie detector; a thought detector."
Of course, it's not as simple as "mind reading." We don't understand the brain well enough to match signals like this with straightforward meaning. But with careful engineering, Bonaci said that preliminary findings showed it was possible to pick up on people's preferences this way (their experiments are still ongoing).
"It's been known in neuroscience for a while now that if a person has a strong emotional response to one of the presented stimuli, then on average 300 milliseconds after they saw a stimulus there is going to be a positive peak hidden within their EEG signal," she said.
The catch: You can't tell what the emotional response was, such as whether it was positive or negative. "But with smartly placed stimuli, you could show people different combinations and play the '20 Questions' game, in a way," said Bonaci.
When I played the Flappy Whale game, the same logos appeared over and over again, which would provide more data about a subject's response to each image and allow the researchers to better discern any patterns.
"One of the cool things is that when you see something you expect, or you see something you don't expect, there's a response—a slightly different response," said Chizeck. "So if you have a fast enough computer connection and you can track those things, then over time you learn a lot about a person."
How likely is it that someone would use a BCI as an attack vector? Chizeck and Bonaci think that the BCI tech itself could easily take off very quickly, especially based on the recent sudden adoption of other technologies when incorporated into popular applications—think augmented reality being flung into the mainstream by Pokémon Go.
BCIs have already been touted in gaming, either as a novel controller or to add new functionality such as monitoring stress levels. It's clear that the ability to "read" someone's brain signals could also be used for other consumer applications: Chizeck painted a future where you could watch a horror film and see it change in response to your brain signals, like a thought-activated choose-your-own-adventure story. Or imagine porn that changes according to what gets your mind racing.
"The problem is, even if someone puts out an application with the best of intentions and there's nothing nefarious about it, someone else can then come and modify it," said Chizeck.
In the Flappy Whale scenario, the researchers imagine that a BCI user might download a game from an app store without realising it has these kind of subliminal messages in it; it'd be like "brain malware." Chizeck pointed out that many fake, malware-laden Pokémon-themed apps appeared in the app store around the real game's release.
But hacking aside, Bonaci and Chizeck argued that the biggest misuse of BCI tech could in fact be advertising, which could pose a threat to users' privacy as opposed to their security.
"Once you put electrodes on people's heads, it's feasible"
You could see BCIs as the ultimate in targeting ads: a direct line to consumers' brains. If you wore a BCI while browsing the web or playing a game, advertisers could potentially serve ads based on your response to items you see. Respond well to that picture of a burger? Here's a McDonald's promotion.
The researchers think there needs to be some kind of privacy policy in apps that use BCIs to ensure people know how their EEG data could be used.
"We usually know when we're giving up our privacy, although that's certainly become less true with online behaviour," said Chizeck. "But this provides an opportunity for someone to gather information from you without you knowing about it at all. When you're entering something on a web form, you can at least think for a second, 'Do I want to type this?'"
Brain signals, on the other hand, are involuntary; they're part of our "wetware."
The reason the University of Washington team is looking into potential privacy and security issues now is to catch any problems before the tech becomes mainstream (if indeed it ever does). In a 2014 paper, they argue that such issues "may be viewed as an attack on human rights to privacy and dignity." They point out that, unlike medical data, there are few legal protections for data generated by BCIs.
One obvious way to help control how BCI data is used would rely on policy rather than technology. Chizeck and Bonaci argue that lawyers, ethicists, and engineers need to work together to decide what it's acceptable to do with this kind of data. Something like an app store certification could then inform consumers as to which apps abide by these standards.
"There has to be an incentive for all app developers, programmers, manufacturers to do it," said Bonaci. "Otherwise why would they change anything about what they're doing right now?"
The Washington team has also suggested a more technical solution, which would effectively "filter" signals so that apps could only access the specific data they require. In their paper, they call this a "BCI Anonymizer" and compare it to smartphone apps having limited access to personal information stored on your phone. "Unintended information leakage is prevented by never transmitting and never storing raw neural signals and any signal components that are not explicitly needed for the purpose of BCI communication and control," they write.
Chizeck said a student in the lab was currently running more tests to characterise further the type and detail of information that can be gleaned through BCIs, and to try a method of filtering this to see if it's possible to block more sensitive data from leaking out.
By doing this work now, they hope to nip future privacy and security concerns in the bud before most people have ever come into contact with a BCI.
"It's technically becoming feasible; once you put electrodes on people's heads, it's feasible," said Chizeck. "The question is, do we want to regulate it, can we regulate it, and how?" : https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/ezp54e/how-hackers-could-get-inside-your-head-with-brain-malware

Chatbot data cannot fall into the hands of big tech
by ANDY PEART 

Imagine the world a decade from now. It’s no longer ruled by powerhouse countries such as the US or China, but by a handful of tech corporations that know everything about us; what we need, buy, say, and ultimately what we desire.
So join me for a short imaginary trip to our possible future. Welcome to the FAMGA (Facebook, Apple, Microsoft, Google, and Amazon) Republic!
We’ll see that the trend started back in 2018, the year that personal assistants really started gaining traction. Amazon’s Echo rapidly surpassed its previous high of 10 million units shipped while embedding it into other devices. At the same time, Google made a serious play for its role in the automated conversational market and Facebook re-launched its chatbot initiatives to expand its reach.
Employing the power of their developer community allowed these tech giants to build vast libraries of FAMGA based applications that consumers used endlessly on their phones, in their homes, and in every part of their lives.
This is point in time when conversational applications really took off — which many people celebrated — but there was a big question left unanswered: What happens with all this data?  
When people communicate in a natural and conversational way, they reveal more than just words. Individual preferences, views, opinions, feelings, and inclinations become part of the conversation.
It’s like being able to listen in, behind the scenes, to every sales assistant’s conversation and customer support agent’s interaction. You are able to understand people’s intentions, actions, and behaviors — maybe even better than they self do.

Chatbots and virtual assistants operate in a very similar format, like a dedicated focus group at your fingertips — comprised of your entire customer base, 24/7, 365 days a year.
Data is insight
When you have this insight, you can begin learning about what people want, taking customer interaction to a whole new level — you begin predicting with certainty.
In 10 years time, we’ll look back to the years leading up to the FAMGA Republic and how we turned a blind eye when we saw that sectors were being closed off, one by one
For example, all of the insight and knowledge helped FAMGA launch the world’s first truly global bank, using the trusted relationship they had developed between users and tech to become the primary financial interface, relegating regional banks to simple service providers.  
Additionally, automakers who had once innocently played with FAMGA digital assistants as the voice interface, suddenly found one of the key differentiators in autonomous vehicles and the personality of their vehicles — was now controlled by others.
Within a few short years, the global economy became controlled by a handful of corporations.
What the future holds
Fortunately for us, this vision isn’t a reality, yet. But it could be.
Data ownership in conversational applications is one of the biggest issues facing enterprises that are looking at developing their digital strategies. Positioned in the middle of your app and customer, the technology provider knows everything your users say.
The information your customers are providing are all valuable data points that can be used to build closer relationships. The data can pick up on ques and translate what looks like a simple transfer of money from one account to the other to understanding actual customer choices. This helps provide a better understanding of your customers personal actions, such as buying a new refrigerator or going on vacation.
At the same time, all of these opportunities to better understand your customer are lost. Customers are providing us with more information about their personal lives which could give us value to building closer relationships but we’re losing them — all while FAMGA is well on its way to building its new country.

The winner of the chatbot conversation won’t necessarily be the one with the smartest conversation. Instead, it will be the one holding the data at the end of the conversation. Lose that, and you might as well give up now.: https://thenextweb.com/contributors/2018/02/11/chatbot-data-cannot-fall-hands-big-tech/

AI software tool disables automated facial tracking

 

As privacy + security concerns increase, artificial intelligence finds solutions.

 

 

--- summary ---

 

Engineering researchers at the University of Toronto, in Canada — used AI software programs to design a privacy filter for your photos that disables automatic facial recognition systems.

Each time you upload a photo or video to a social media platform, its facial recognition systems learn a little more about you. These algorithms ingest data about who you are, your location, and people you know — and they’re constantly improving.

As concerns over privacy + data security on social networks grow, Univ. of Toronto researchers have created a computer software algorithm to dynamically disrupt facial recognition systems.

Their solution leverages a deep learning technique called adversarial training, which pits 2 AI algorithms against each other. In computing, deep learning is a math technique that uses complex sets of data — trained to find solutions to problems — to process information…: https://www.kurzweilai.net/digest-ai-software-tool-disables-automated-facial-tracking

02-10-21

These two technologies could supercharge our privacy on the internet

To bring back privacy, we need both encryption and decentralization.

BY STEVEN WATERHOUSE

In recent years, the negative impacts of social media and other global technology platforms have become a top concern for people around the world. The danger seems to grow by the day: Recently, we learned that the popular encrypted messaging service WhatsApp has been sharing user data with Facebook since 2016. The news comes as social media giants such as Twitter and Facebook, once lauded for facilitating the free dissemination of ideas, are increasingly seen as having failed to effectively moderate misinformation and conspiracy theories on their platforms. The internet, as currently constituted, has a dark side.

Government action to legislate privacy protection, from Europe to California, is a reflection of the public’s increasing concern for their online safety. But bewilderingly, in the midst of the growing demand for strong privacy protections, governments around the world are also working to kneecap the very encryption that makes true privacy possible in the name of public safety.

When it comes to strengthening digital privacy, the most important technologies are end-to-end encryption and decentralization. They’re even more powerful when they’re combined. Here’s how encryption and decentralization could work together to protect your safety and privacy online.

NOT ALL ENCRYPTION IS CREATED EQUAL

“Encryption” is a widely used and poorly understood term. When we say something is encrypted, what we mean is that its characteristics have been scrambled—encoded—while it is in transit between two places. Only the sender and the receiver have the “key” to unscramble or “decrypt” its contents, meaning hackers or other third parties can’t intercept it and steal the information in transit.

Digital services, particularly those focused on financial transactions and messaging, often use a form of encryption. These include Facebook, WhatsApp, WeChat, PayPal, and Venmo, as well as most major financial institutions. But just because something is encrypted doesn’t make it private.

Many services that advertise themselves as encrypted do not protect their users’ privacy in a meaningful way. Most financial institutions, for example, encrypt the contents of transactions while they are in transit, but then decrypt them when they reach the institution’s online server. As a result, even though information is private while en route from place to place, the records of the activity are ultimately stored in cloud-based databases and are just as susceptible to online threats as any other information.

The claims of many messaging services are similarly misleading. Like big banks, they encrypt messages while they’re in transit but decode them when they reach the companies’ web servers. This means that, encryption or no, these tech giants can see the contents of every message sent over their networks. These messaging services, if they desired or were compelled, could share every message their users have exchanged.

For true privacy, we need to look for services that employ end-to-end encryption. With end-to-end, the contents of communications are not known to anyone except the sender and the receiver. When you send a message over a service that is end-to-end encrypted, it is only decrypted on the device that sends the message and the device that receives it. It doesn’t live anywhere in the online ether; neither the operators of the service nor any other third party can see what the message says. The rapid growth of Signal, an end-to-end encrypted messaging app, demonstrates the surging consumer demand for digital privacy.

The future of end-to-end encryption is uncertain. Over the past year, governments around the world, from the U.S. and E.U. to Russia and China, have introduced or tightened rules that, if fully implemented, would make true end-to-end encryption impossible. Most of these proposed laws would require tech companies to design “backdoors” that would allow authorities to demand that the contents of messages and other activities be decrypted and turned over. Once such backdoor keys exist, it’s a matter of when, not if, they fall into the wrong hands.

THE MOST RESILIENT SYSTEMS ARE ENCRYPTED AND DECENTRALIZED

In order to have meaningful digital privacy, the world needs end-to-end encryption. And for encrypted systems to be resilient, they should also be decentralized, adopting a key technical foundation of the many blockchain projects promising to reshape finance and other sectors in the coming years.

To visualize the way decentralization works in practice, think of a hard drive. If all your files are stored in a single place, and it fails or is damaged, your files are lost. To mitigate this risk, then, you might back up your files to a cloud server. That way, even if one or all of your physical hard drives fail, your files are safe, stored digitally in the cloud.

But the problem is not solved. What happens if, for instance, Amazon or Google or Apple decides to suddenly deny you access? In that scenario, you are out of luck again: The storage provider, not you, ultimately has control over those files. For true security, you need multiple backups over which you have the ultimate control.

Decentralization applies this approach to all digital activity. Decentralized networks such as blockchains are designed to operate by consensus across many different nodes, removing the risk of a single point of failure. They offer new possibilities around network governance as well, with incentives and standards of behavior that can be implemented by consensus rather than by corporate executives. Given these benefits, mainstream platforms are increasingly looking to decentralized alternatives. Even Twitter has revealed plans for a decentralized open standard for social media.

Blockchains facilitate their users’ privacy through end-to-end encryption. And they are resilient to third-party manipulation because of decentralization. Unlike centralized servers, a blockchain cannot be compromised by a single breach.

This principle can be applied across many different technical areas, including social media, to strengthen and advance digital privacy. There can be no safeguarding privacy without end-to-end encryption; government efforts to undermine this important tool should have us all worried. But as long as there are end-to-end encrypted services, the most resilient will be those that are decentralized. If we work to advance privacy with these two technical concepts in mind, 2021 can be the year people around the world start to truly reclaim their online privacy.

https://www.fastcompany.com/90602972/encryption-and-decentralization-privacy


Vai tiešām pavisam tuvā nākotnē varēs “izskaitļot” ikviena cilvēka iespējas nākotnē? Un cik daudz par tevi drīkst zināt darba devējs?

By José Luis Peñarredonda
26 March 2018
If you worked for Ford in 1914, chances are at some stage in your career a private investigator was hired to follow you home.
If you stopped for a drink, or squabbled with your spouse, or did something that might make you less of a competent worker the following day, your boss would soon know about it.
This sleuthing was partly because Ford’s workers earned a better salary than the competition. The car manufacturer raised pay from $2.39 a day to $5 a day, the equivalent of $124 (£88) today. But you had to be a model citizen to qualify.
This ‘Big Brother’ operation was run by the Ford Sociological Department, a team of inspectors that arrived unannounced on employees’ doorsteps
Your house needed to be clean, your children attending school, your savings account had to be in good shape. If someone at the factory believed you were on the wrong path, you might not only miss out on a promotion, your job was on the line.
This ‘Big Brother’ operation was run by the Ford Sociological Department, a team of inspectors that arrived unannounced on employees’ doorsteps. Its aim was to “promote the health, safety and comfort of workers”, as an internal document put it. And, to be fair, it also offered everything from medical services to housekeeping courses.
The programme lasted eight years. It was expensive, and many workers resented its paternalism and intrusion. Today, most of us would find it unacceptable – what does my work have to do with my laundry, bank account or relationships?
Yet, the idea of employers trying to control workers’ lives beyond the workplace has persisted, and digital tools have made it easier than ever. Chances are, you use several technologies that could create a detailed profile of your activities and habits, both in the office and out of it. But what can (and can’t) employers do with this data? And, where do we draw the line?
What’s my worker score?
We’re all being graded every day. The expensive plane tickets I bought recently have already popped up in my credit score. The fact that I‘ve stopped jogging every morning has been noted by my fitness app – and, if it were connected with an insurance company, this change might push up my premiums.
From my online activity, Facebook knows I love beer, and believes my screen is a good spot for hipster brewery adverts. One website recently claimed that I am Colombia’s 1,410 th most influential Twitter user – something that could improve my credit score, it seems. And, yes, my desirability and efficiency as a worker is also up for evaluation and can be given a number.
And we’re not just talking the ‘rate-a-trader’ style online review process used on freelancer platforms or gig-economy services. A scoring system of sorts has lodged itself in the corporate world.
HR departments are crunching increasing volumes of data to measure employees in a more granular way
HR departments are crunching increasing volumes of data to measure employees in a more granular way. From software that records every keystroke, or the ‘smart’ coffee machines that will only give you a hot drink if you tap it with your work ID badge there are more opportunities than ever for bosses to measure behaviour.
Some analysts think this industry could be worth more than $1 billion by 2022.
One big aim of data collection is to make “predictions about how long an employee will stay, and it may influence hiring, firing, or retention of people,” says Phoebe Moore, Associate Professor of Political Economy and Technology at Leicester University in the UK and author of the book The Quantified Self in Precarity: Work, Technology and What Counts.
Data collection is “changing employment relationships, the way people work and what the expectations can be”, says Moore.
One problem with this approach is that it’s blind to some of the non-quantifiable aspects of work. Some of the subtler things I do in order to be a better writer, for instance, are not quantifiable: having a drink with someone who tells me a great story, or imagining a piece on my commute. None of these things would show up in my ‘job score’. “A lot of the qualitative aspects of work are being written out,” says Moore, “because if you can’t measure them, they don’t exist”. 
The dilemma of data
A healthy, physically active person is a better worker, right? Research consistently suggests activity decreases absenteeism and increases productivity. This has spawned a thriving health and wellness industry with programmes worth billions.
Employees value these health initiatives not only because their bosses might allow them time off to participate but also because if they track exercise via their phone, smartwatch or fitness wristband they can earn rewards.
“I can just wear this device, and I get points and buy stuff for doing things I would already (be) doing anyway without it,” says Lauren Hoffman, a former salesperson for one of the programmes in the US, who was also enrolled in it herself.
Furthermore, the workplace offers an environment that can help people to reach their health goals. Research suggeststhat fitness programmes work better when they are combined with social encouragement, collaboration and competition. Offices can foster all that: they can organise running clubs, weekly fitness classes or competitions to help workers thrive.
There are several good business reasons to collect data on employees – from doing better risk management to examining if social behaviours in the workplace can lead to gender discrimination.  “Companies fundamentally don't understand how people interact and collaborate at work,”, says Ben Waber, president and CEO of Humanyze, an American company which gathers and analyses data about the workplace. He says that he can show them.
Humanyze gathers data from two sources. The first is the metadata from employees’ communications: their email, phone or corporate messaging service. The company says analysing this metadata doesn’t include reading the content of these messages, nor the individual identities of the people involved, but involves crunching the more general information i.e. duration, frequency and general localisation so, will tell them which department an employee belongs to.
The second area is data gathered from gadgets like Bluetooth infrared sensors which detect how many people are working in one particular part of an office and how they move around. They also use ‘supercharged’ ID badges that, as Waber says, are beefed up with “microphones which don't record what you say, but do voice-processing in real time.” This allows measurement of the proportion of time you speak, or how often people interrupt you.
After six weeks of research, the employer gets a ‘big picture’ of the problem it wants to solve, based on the analysed data. If the aim, for instance, is to boost sales, they can analyse what their best salespeople do that others don’t. Or if they want to measure productivity, they can infer that the more efficient workers talk more often with their managers.
Waber sees it as “a lens of very large work issues, like diversity, inclusion, workload assessment, workspace planning, or regulatory risk”. His business case is that these tools will help companies save millions of dollars and even years of time. 
Collection and protection
But not everyone is convinced of the usefulness of these techniques, or whether such personally intrusive technology can be justified. A PwC survey from 2015 reveals that 56% of employees would use a wearable device given by their employer if it was aimed at improving their wellbeing at work. “There should be some payback from something like this, some benefit in terms of their workplace conditions, or advantages,” says Raj Mody, an analyst from the firm. And Hoffman remembers that these programmes were not always an easy sell. “You’re going to get the data and you're going to use it against me,” she was often told by sceptical workers.
There is a fundamental problem: these measurements are often inaccurate
And there is a fundamental problem: these fitness tracking measurements are often inaccurate. People are very bad at self-reporting and fitness trackers and smartphones are not exactly precise. A recent evidence review shows that different models and techniques gather different results and it is very difficult to draw trustworthy comparisons between them.
It is also unclear if counting steps, for instance, is actually a good way of measuring activity, both because this measurement doesn’t take intensity into account – a step made while running counts just as much as a step made walking at home – and walking is more difficult for some than others.
Another issue is the amount of data these programmes can collect. They not only track your daily activity, but also often offer health screenings for participants, which allows them to register things that don’t seem like your boss’s business: your cholesterol level, your weight, or even your DNA.
In most cases, it is illegal in the US and Europe for companies to discriminate against workers based on their health data or any genetic test results, but there are some grey areas. In 2010, Pamela Fink, the PR manager of an energy firm in the US, sued her employer because she claimed she was sacked due to a double mastectomy to reduce her probability of developing cancer. While the company didn’t have access to her DNA results, she contended that they knew about the risk because the surgery showed up on her insurance bills. The case was settled out of court.
Wellness programme providers say that employers only see aggregated and anonymised data, so they can’t target specific employees based on their wellness results. Humanyze ensures its clients are not forcing their employees to be monitored, but instead give them the chance to opt in. In a similar fashion to wellness programmes, they anonymise and collate the information that they share with employers. Waber is emphatic that his company never sells the data on to third parties, and emphasises transparency throughout the process.
But this kind of data could be used in more controversial ways, and the goodwill of the companies involved doesn’t eliminate all the risks. Data could be stolen in a cyberattack, for instance, or it could be used in ways that are not transparent for users. It “could be sold to basically anyone, for whatever purpose, and recirculated in other ways,” says Ifeoma Awunja, a sociologist at Cornell University who researches the use of health data in the workplace.
Taking a short-term profit on user data would damage your company’s reputation - Scott Montgomery
There are reports that some providers are doing just thatalready – even if they data they sell is anonymous, they could be cross-referenced with other anonymous data to identify people. Not all these companies do it, and some say it is not smart business to do so. “Taking a short-term profit on user data would damage your company’s reputation, causing user volume to plummet and thus your value to clients to diminish” says Scott Montgomery, CEO of Wellteq, a corporate wellness provider based in Singapore.
But even if all the companies did the right thing and acted only in their costumers’ best interest, people in some places are still only protected by their wellness programme’s goodwill. The US law is “significantly behind” the European Union and other parts of the world in protecting users, says Awunja.
In the EU, a new General Data Protection Regulation (GDRP) will come into force thisMay, which will outlaw any use of personal data to which the user didn’t explicitly consent. In the US, the legislation varies between states. In some of them, sharing some health information with third parties is not illegal as long as the data doesn’t identify the person. Furthermore, according to Gary Phelan, a lawyer at Mitchell & Sheridan in the US, since this data is generally not considered medical data, it does not have the privacy restrictions as medical data.
 Human beings are evaluated in terms of the risk that they pose to the firm - Awunja                        
There is also the question of return on investment for the employers. Do they actually save businesses money? These programmes are meant to lower health insurance premiums both for companies and employees, since they are supposed to decrease health risk, sick days, and hospital costs. But it is not clear if this actually happens. A 2013 study by the Rand Corporation claims that, while these programmes save companies enough money to pay for themselves, they “are having little if any immediate effects on the amount employers spend on health care.”
With all these tools, “human beings are evaluated in terms of the risk that they pose to the firm,” says Awunja. Still, it’s a complicated balance: dealing with the everyday habits of employees as if they were just another hit to the bottom line sounds a lot like the old days of the Sociological Department. Whatever benefits these technologies can bring, they have to balance with the privacy rights and expectations of workers.
Balance
There is an episode from TV show Black Mirror that offers a chilling warning. In it, every person is given a score based on their interactions on a social platform that looks strikingly like Instagram. This score defines almost every opportunity they have in life: what jobs they can get, where they live, which plane tickets they can buy or who can they date. In fact, in 2020 China will roll a mandatory Citizen Score calculated from a number of data sources, from your purchase history to the books you read.
Although not quite as sinister, this illustrates the technological, legal and ethical limitations of doing something similar elsewhere. In most parts of the world, the law prevents your HR department from sharing or requesting data about you from your credit card provider, your healthcare provider, or your favourite online dating site, unless you explicitly consent that it can do so.
This should keep the most cynical temptations at bay for now, but how to reap the benefits of data in an acceptable way? There is a strong case for finding this balance: as Waber says, data can give you evidence-based advice for advancing your career, or for enhancing your effectivity at work. Having a space for taking care of your health at work might improve your happiness at your job, and some studies suggest that this also translates into a productivity push.
Part of the answer seems to be to agree to certain ethical standards. In a paper, Awunja proposes some practices like informing employees of the potential risks for discrimination with the data, not penalising those who decline to take part in these programmes, and setting a clear ‘expiration date’ to the collected data.
This is an important conversation to have, even if you are of those with nothing to hide. As it turns out, it is very likely that giving away our data is going to be part of the everyday experience of work in the near future, at least in the corporate world.



Nav komentāru:

Ierakstīt komentāru